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Revamping The Right To Be Informed: 
Protecting Consumers Under New Jersey’s 
Truth-In-Consumer Contract, Warranty And 
Notice Act
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the 1960s, “courts were notorious for their 
insensitivity to consumer interests, while legislatures did little in 
the way of offering the consumer comprehensive protection 
against business fraud.”1  However, the tide of legislation began 
to turn in the 1960s as a movement for greater consumer 
protections finally reached the ears of an individual with a 
powerful voice: President John F. Kennedy. 
On March 16, 1962, President Kennedy delivered a 
special message to Congress declaring a Bill of Consumer 
Rights.2  He delineated consumer interests that required 
protection to further the well-being of individuals and families: 
the right to safety, the right to be informed, the right to choose, 
and the right to be heard.3 His comment that the “march of 
technology . . .  has increased the difficulties of the consumer” 
was referencing the now practically archaic technology of the 
1960s.4 However, his statement that these technological 
 J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Arkansas School of Law. The author sincerely
thanks Professor Mary Beth Matthews for her insight and constant guidance, without which 
this Comment would not have come to fruition.
1. 1 HOWARD J. ALPERIN & RONALD F. CHASE, CONSUMER LAW: SALES PRACTICES
AND CREDIT REGULATION § 101 (1986); Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade 
Practices Under Little FTC Acts: Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 DICK. L. REV.  
373, 374 (1990).  
2. President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Protecting the
Consumer Interest (Mar. 15, 1962), reprinted in AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-protecting-the-
consumer-interest [https://perma.cc/7L69-74JL] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
3. Id.
4. Id.
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progressions “[have] outmoded many of the old laws and 
regulations and made new legislation necessary”5 aptly describes 
the issue fueling legislation involving New Jersey’s Truth-in-
Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act6 (“TCCWNA”) in 
the face of online terms and conditions.  Specifically, the 
TCCWNA is written in a way that does not adequately protect 
consumers’ rights in light of technological advancements like 
online contracting and online terms and conditions. 
Perhaps the most germane of the consumer rights 
mentioned—the “right to be informed”—is defined as “the 
right . . . to be protected against fraudulent, deceitful, or grossly 
misleading information, advertising, labeling, or other practices, 
and to be given the facts [the consumer] needs to make an 
informed choice.”7  The enumerated disdain for fraudulent, 
deceitful, and misleading information, while certainly not a new 
sentiment, was representative of the movement toward greater 
consumer protection in the 1960s that sparked the enactment of a 
number of statutes punishing exactly such practices.8  President 
Kennedy’s desire that his “recommendations and requests . . . 
alert every agency and branch of government to the needs of our 
consumers” was certainly heard.9 
The most notable federal legislation to arise in response to 
the pressures of the 1960s consumer protection movement were 
the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act of 1962,10 the Truth 
in Lending Act of 1968,11 the Uniform Consumer Sales Practice 
5. Id.
6. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-14 to -18 (West 2018).
7. Kennedy, supra note 3.
8. See Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair
or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade Commission 
Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 521 (1980). 
9. Kennedy, supra note 3.
10. ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 2 (“[T]he Act was designed to modernize the
common law action for unfair competition. As such, the Act covers only practices relating 
to misleading trade identifications and false and deceptive advertising and, realistically 
speaking, is directed to businessmen aggrieved by the acts of their competitors, although its 
terms do not preclude consumers from using its remedies.”). Due to the act only providing 
an injunction rather than money damages, consumers had little incentive to sue. Id. 
11. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1693r
(2012)). 
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Act of 1970,12 the National Consumer Act of 1970,13 and 
amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act.14  In addition 
to federal legislation, many states followed suit in enacting their 
own versions of consumer protection statutes15 modeled after one 
or more of the 1960s and 1970s federal statutes.16  By 1981, every 
state had enacted some form of a consumer protection statute “for 
the express purpose of providing consumers with a broad-based 
protection from business fraud and deception.”17  While many of 
the statutes did not substantially deviate from federal models, 
some states, like New Jersey, were more creative in crafting their 
legislation. 
New Jersey chose not only to enact a Consumer Fraud Act 
in 1960,18 which mirrored many other federal and state consumer 
protection statutes, but also to pass the Truth-in-Consumer 
Contract, Warranty and Notice Act in 1981.19  Unlike the 
Consumer Fraud Act and other state and federal consumer 
12. ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 2, § 104 (1986) (“This Act was drafted for the
benefit of consumers, its heart being a prohibition against ‘deceptive’ or ‘unconscionable’ 
acts or practices by any seller or supplier who regularly engages in consumer 
transactions . . . . The Act contains provisions for administrative enforcement by a state 
agency which would have the power to make rules and to obtain restitution for consumers, 
as well as provisions for private actions to be brought by consumers for declaratory and 
injunctive relief and for monetary damages”). 
13. Id. § 105 (“[T]he National Consumer Act classifies the specified practices as
‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ and contains a true ‘catch-all’ category. This provision 
makes it unlawful for a merchant to engage ‘in any act or practice which is unfair or deceptive 
to the consumer.’ . . . [A] consumer who is induced to participate in a transaction as a result 
of a merchant’s unlawful sales practices may recover from him actual and punitive damages, 
or 30% of the transaction total, or $300, whichever is greater.”). 
14. Id. § 101 (namely, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, which “expanded F.T.C. 
jurisdiction to ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.’ The 1975 
amendment, unquestionably a response to two celebrated reports condemning the 
Commission for producing a bureaucratic maze and ignoring the needs of lower income 
people frequently victimized by all sorts of business fraud, allows the Commission to 
regulate unfair or deceptive acts or practices ‘which, while local in character, nevertheless 
have an adverse impact upon interstate commerce.’”) (emphasis in original). 
15. See DEE PRIGDEN & RICHARD ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE
LAW, app. 3A at 171-74 (2017-2018 ed. 2017). 
16. ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 2, § 102 (“The model acts [federal legislation]
unquestionably provided assistance and encouragement to the states to adopt modern and 
strong consumer protection laws.”). 
17. Id.
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 2018).
19. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:12-14 to -18.
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protection statutes, the TCCWNA was exceptionally broad in its 
scope.20  Despite the breadth of the 1981 statute and its 
consequent power to hold sellers and businesses accountable, it 
went largely unnoticed until the mid-2000s when litigation 
concerning the statute was first filed.21  Such litigation 
dramatically increased in frequency around 2015.22 
The new litigation filed concerning the TCCWNA 
primarily focuses on online terms and conditions presented to 
consumers, such as Apple’s iTunes “Terms and Conditions” 
which, allegedly, contain provisions that violate the consumer’s 
rights and seller’s responsibilities in a manner that is deceptive to 
the consumer.23  Given that the statute was written and enacted in 
the 1980s, it is unlikely that the legislature considered the 
applicability of the statute in the light of the now prevalent online 
terms and conditions offered to consumers.  However, the 
sentiment of ensuring that consumers have access to 
reliable/accurate information, are informed of their rights, and can 
enforce those rights remains a crucial concern.  The TCCWNA 
contains vague and broad language that is undefined by the 
legislature and muddies the already complex world of enforcing 
online agreements between sellers and consumers, frustrating 
these interests.24 
It is debatable whether further definition of the 
terminology will even be sufficient to address and resolve the 
problems posed regarding enforceability of online terms and 
20. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-15 (requiring no proof of damages, applicable to
“prospective” consumers and including merely the offering of a sign, notice, or contract, 
rather than focusing on advertising and having a narrow applicable scope with strict 
requirements like the Consumer Fraud Act).   
21. Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 70 A.3d 544, 550 (N.J. 2013).
22. Michael P. Daly et al., Courts Continue Crackdown on New Jersey’s Truth-in-
Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act, DRINKERBIDDLE (Apr. 12, 2017), 
http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/insights/publications/2017/04/courts-continue-crackdown 
[https://perma.cc/J4M6-4CAX]. 
23. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss at 7-11, Silkowski v. Apple, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-02338-JD (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2016). 
24. Kymberly Kochis et al., Legal Alert: Hit ‘em Where They Ain’t – TCCWNA Class
Actions Target Broad Range of Consumer-Facing Practices, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 5, 2017), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=533efee6-480d-483a-ac7f-91a2b4c7245f 
[https://perma.cc/L9VM-LDQE]. 
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conditions.  While the TCCWNA expresses views about which 
individuals should be increasingly concerned in an era of 
pervasive technology that infiltrates nearly every aspect of one’s 
life,25 the statute does not efficiently operate to achieve its stated 
goals.  As President Kennedy suggested in the 1960s, new 
legislation is likely necessary to protect consumers in a manner 
that still addresses technological developments and allows 
business to operate in the largely online world of the 2010’s. 
Part I of this article lays out the history of the enactment 
of the TCCWNA as well as the requirements for bringing a claim 
under the statute.  This section includes detailed information 
about what is covered under the statute and the issues the New 
Jersey courts are currently facing in defining the vague 
terminology not addressed by the New Jersey legislature in its 
enactment of the TCCWNA. 
Part II of this article addresses other existing state 
consumer protection statutes, categorizing them according to the 
levels of protection afforded to consumers.  This section includes 
an analysis of the effectiveness of the various statutes’ 
implementation, measured by the inclusion and exclusion of 
various provisions that tend to either strengthen or weaken 
consumer protection. 
Finally, Part III of this article compares the TCCWNA 
with other state statutes and argues that it is an inappropriate 
method of addressing consumer protection and business 
concerns.  This article also argues that the New Jersey legislature 
needs to conduct a significant overhaul of the statute—if not 
completely rewrite it—to properly address the online world of 
consumer transactions, namely the presentation of online terms 
and conditions and compliance with the statute by sellers, and 
makes suggestions as to specific revisions. 
25. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:12-15 (West 2018).
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PART I: BACKGROUND AND PROBLEMS 
SURROUNDING THE TCCWNA 
Part I will discuss New Jersey’s attempts to protect 
consumers in their transactions, and provide a background of the 
various statutes that enforce consumer protection as well as how 
they interact with one another.  This section will focus primarily 
on the TCCWNA26 and the New Jersey Consumer Protection 
Act.27 
A. THE TCCWNA
In 1981, the New Jersey legislature enacted the 
TCCWNA, which states: 
No seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee shall in the course 
of his business offer to any consumer or prospective 
consumer or enter into any written consumer contract or give 
or display any written consumer warranty, notice or sign 
after the effective date of this act which includes any 
provision that violates any clearly established legal right of 
a consumer or responsibility of a seller, lessor, creditor, 
lender or bailee as established by State or Federal law at the 
time the offer is made or the consumer contract is signed or 
the warranty, notice or sign is given or displayed.  Consumer 
means any individual who buys, leases, borrows, or bails any 
money, property or service which is primarily for personal, 
family or household purposes.  The provisions of this act 
shall not apply to residential leases or to the sale of real 
estate, whether improved or not, or to the construction of 
new homes subject to “The New Home Warranty and 
Builders’ Registration Act,” P.L.1977, c. 467 (C. 46:3B-1 et 
seq.).28 
Critically, the act further provides: 
No consumer contract, warranty, notice or sign, as provided 
for in this act, shall contain any provision by which the 
26. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:12-14 to -18
27. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 to -210.
28. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-15 (emphasis added).
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consumer waives his rights under this act.  Any such 
provision shall be null and void.  No consumer contract, 
notice or sign shall state that any of its provisions is or may 
be void, unenforceable or inapplicable in some jurisdictions 
without specifying which provisions are or are not void, 
unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New 
Jersey; provided, however, that this shall not apply to 
warranties.29 
Any seller found in violation of the TCCWNA is liable to the 
“aggrieved consumer” for a variety of damages, including a “civil 
penalty of not less than $100.00 or for actual damages, or both at 
the election of the consumer, together with reasonable attorney’s 
fees and court costs.”30  The TCCWNA concludes by noting that 
the rights and remedies available are “in addition to and 
cumulative of any other right, remedy or prohibition accorded by 
common law, Federal law or statutes of this State, and nothing 
contained herein shall be construed to deny, abrogate or impair 
any such common law or statutory right, remedy or 
prohibition.”31 
B. REASONS FOR ENACTING
The legislative history and supporting documentation 
regarding the enactment of the TCCWNA is lacking.  An 
examination of the cultural and political climate surrounding its 
enactment is necessary to understand the motives behind the 
passage of such a bill.  Due to the vague nature of the statute, 
courts have struggled to ascertain such motives and apply the 
statute in a manner that would be consistent with legislative 
29. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-16 (emphasis added).
30. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-17 (West 2018). Courts regularly apply $100 as the
penalty under the TCCWNA, but note that the text of the statute still permits awarding higher 
damages if the facts of the particular case warrant such. Bovgirya v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 
Civ. No. 2:17-cv-06248, 2018 WL 3954855, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2018). 
31. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-18 (West 2018).
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intent.32  The statement accompanying the bill in 1980 begins 
with the compelling declaration: 
Far too many consumer contracts, warranties, notices and 
signs contain provisions which clearly violate the rights of 
consumers.  Even though these provisions are legally invalid 
or unenforceable, their very inclusion in a contract, 
warranty, notice or sign deceives a consumer into thinking 
that they are enforceable and for this reason the consumer 
often fails to enforce his rights.33 
Given this language, it is clear that the legislature’s intent 
in enacting the TCCWNA was aimed at “the misleading effect 
such a provision may have on a potential plaintiff prior to 
litigation, discouraging otherwise viable suits by falsely 
suggesting the law precludes them.”34  The language addressing 
misleading provisions is likely reflective of the larger consumer 
protection movement that began in the 1960s that also spurred the 
enactment of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, which 
targeted similar problems by way of a narrower scope.35  The 
Governor, in his signing statement, “described the bill 
[TCCWNA] as ‘strengthening provisions of the [CFA].’”36  
Additionally, and notably, consideration of the TCCWNA was 
“contemporaneous with . . . the Federal Trade [Commission’s 
promulgation of] regulations to effectuate the Magnuson-Moss 
Act.”37  This context suggests that the New Jersey Legislature and 
Congress “shared some of the same concerns” in regards to 
consumer protection, despite the fact that the TCCWNA was 
enacted nearly ten years after the Consumer Fraud Act.38 
32. See, e.g., Castro v. Sovran Self Storage, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 204, 217 (D.N.J. 
2015) (struggling to ascertain what precisely is a “clearly established right” under 
TCCWNA).  
33. Statement, N.J.S.A. 56:12-14, -18, Assem. Bill. No. A1660 (1981) [hereinafter
“Statement”] (emphasis added). 
34. Castro, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 216.
35. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 to -210 (West 2018).
36. Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 70 A.3d 544, 552 (N.J. 2013) (quoting Governor
Brendan Byrne, Statement on Signing Assembly Bill No. 1660 (Jan. 11, 1982)). 
37. Shelton, 70 A.3d at 552. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act “mandates specific
disclosures of warranties of consumer products costing more than $5.” Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 
2302(e) (2012). 
38. Shelton, 70 A.3d at 553.
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As the courts have applied the TCCWNA to various 
factual scenarios, they have attempted to determine the intent of 
the legislature regarding the scope and application of the 
TCCWNA.  Several courts have concluded that the New Jersey 
legislature intended for the TCCWNA to be applied in a broad 
manner.39  The TCCWNA covers only the inclusion of legal 
provisions and not the omission of legal provisions,40 and as such 
is intended to bolster the already existing rights of consumers 
rather than create new substantive rights that a consumer can 
enforce or that sellers can violate.41  The TCCWNA serves an 
alternative purpose to that of truth-in-lending and truth-in-leasing 
laws because, “by its terms, it encompasses a wider variety of 
transactions” and also seeks to “prevent deceptive practices in 
consumer contracts by prohibiting the use of illegal terms or 
warranties in consumer contracts.”42 
The relative lack of legislative history or references to 
outside cultural or political events that may have spurred the 
enactment of the TCCWNA when New Jersey already had a state 
consumer protection statute leaves the question of the act’s 
applicability and scope open for argument.  That leeway is even 
more significant in a world where technology is constantly 
creating new ways in which consumers interact with sellers and 
enter into binding online agreements.43  The technological realm 
is where most of the litigation surrounding the TCCWNA 
currently focuses.44 
C. ELEMENTS OF A TCCNWA CLAIM
To bring a TCCWNA claim, a plaintiff must show: 
39. See, e.g., Smerling v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., No. A-4937-13T3, 2016 WL
4717997, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 2016) (quoting trial court’s holding that TCCWNA 
should be “construed liberally” in favor of consumers).  
40. Watkins v. DineEquity, Inc., 591 Fed. App’x. 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2014)
(unpublished). 
41. Mladenov v. Wegman’s Food Mkts., Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 360, 380 (D.N.J. 2015).
42. Shelton, 70 A.3d at 549.
43. See Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1327, 1333 (2011). 
44. See infra Part I.D.
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1. The plaintiff is a consumer;
2. The defendant is a seller;
3. The seller offers a consumer contract or gives
or displays any written notice, or sign; and
4. That contract, notice or sign includes a
provision that violates any legal right of a
consumer or responsibility of a seller.45
1. Plaintiff is a Consumer
According to the TCCWNA, a consumer is defined as 
“any individual who buys, leases, borrows, or bails any money, 
property or service which is primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes.”46  A plaintiff may also be a bailee, which 
requires only that the plaintiff fulfill the elements of bailment.47 
2. Defendant is a Seller
Currently neither the statute, legislature, or the courts 
define what requirements must be met for the defendant to be a 
seller.  However, by reference to the definition of the consumer, 
it is safe to assume that a seller—for the purposes of the 
TCCWNA—is an individual or business entity that makes 
available to a consumer any money, property, or service primarily 
for personal, family, or household purposes.48  According to this 
definition, any number of individuals or business entities will fall 
under the reach of the TCCWNA. 
3. Consumer Contract
The text of the statute defines a consumer contract as: 
45. Watkins, 591 Fed. App’x. at 135.
46. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-15 (West 2018).
47. Mattson v. Aetna Life Ins., Co., 124 F. Supp. 3d 381, 393 (D.N.J. 2015) (defining
bailment as the “delivery of personal property by one person to another in trust for a specific 
purpose, acceptance of such delivery, and express or implied agreement to carry out the trust 
and return the property to the bailor”). 
48. Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 70 A.3d 544, 550 (N.J. 2013).
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a written agreement in which an individual: (a) leases or 
licenses real or personal property; (b) obtains credit; (c) 
obtains insurance coverage, except insurance coverage 
contained in policies subject to the ‘Life and Health 
Insurance Policy Language Simplification Act’; (d) borrows 
money; (e) purchases real or personal property; (f) contracts 
for services including professional services; or (g) enters into 
a service contract.49 
The TCCWNA applies to both tangible and intangible 
property.50  However, the TCCWNA expressly excludes 
transactions involving the lease or sale of real property.51 Beyond 
a standard written agreement, even a mere written notice or sign 
is covered by the act.52 Even something as nominal as a restaurant 
menu may be considered a written agreement for the purposes of 
the TCCWNA.53 Courts have held that dining out and pursuing 
entertainment are quintessential personal, family, or household 
pursuits, meaning that restaurant certificates issued from an 
internet business will qualify as property under the TCCWNA.54 
4. Violation of Consumer’s Legal Right or Seller’s
Responsibility 
The issue of what constitutes a legal right of a consumer 
or a seller’s responsibility is the most complicated and most 
litigated element of a TCCWNA claim.55  Courts have not been 
able to devise a comprehensive definition and have often differed 
49. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-1 (West 2018) (internal citation omitted).
50. Shelton, 70 A.3d at 555.
51. Id. at 551.
52. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-15 (West 2018); Bohus v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 784 F.3d 
918, 922-23 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Shelton, 70 A.3d at 549, 558-59). However, sales 
receipts do not count as either contracts or notices for purposes of the TCCWNA. Barile v. 
Gf-Passaic Foods, LLC, No. A-4706-16T1, 2018 WL 3945769, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Aug. 17, 2018) (unpublished). 
53. Watkins v. DineEquity, Inc., 591 Fed. App’x. 132, 133, 141 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(unpublished); Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc. 171 A.3d 620, 648 (N.J. 2017). 
54. Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 70 A.3d 544, 555 (N.J. 2013).
55. Brian O’Donnell & Jeffrey Baker, NJ High Court Will Bring Welcome Clarity to
Consumer Law, LAW 360 (Apr. 14, 2017, 12:55 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/913381/nj-high-court-will-bring-welcome-clarity-to-
consumer-law [https://perma.cc/L859-EL2K]. 
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in their conclusions.  This precise issue was recently addressed by 
the New Jersey Supreme Court in answer to two questions 
certified to it by the Third Circuit: what constitutes an “aggrieved 
consumer” and what rights of consumers are “clearly established 
legal rights.”56  In Spade v. Select Comfort Corp., the New Jersey 
Supreme Court found that a “seller’s inclusion in a consumer 
sales contract or agreement of language prohibited by N.J.A.C. 
13:45-A–5.3(c) may alone constitute a violation of a ‘clearly 
established legal right . . . ‘ under N.J.S.A. 56:12-15, and thus 
may provide a basis for relief under the TCCWNA” and that 
TCCWNA requires “a consumer to show that he or she has 
suffered harm, even if that harm does not warrant an award or 
damages . . . in order for that consumer to constitute an 
‘aggrieved consumer’ for purposes of the TCCWNA.”57 Lower 
courts have also attempted to clarify both terms, but have not done 
so in a way that substantially advanced the existing understanding 
of the phrases.58 
a. Aggrieved Consumer
The TCCWNA does not require the plaintiff to prove any 
actual damages.59  However, this component of the statute has 
presented a significant issue for plaintiffs, especially in federal 
court.  In order for an Article III court to have jurisdiction, the 
United States Supreme Court held in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins that 
“the injury-in-fact requirement requires a plaintiff to allege an 
injury that is both ‘concrete and particularized.’”60  In light of the 
Spokeo ruling, New Jersey courts have held the plaintiff need not 
allege damages, but the plaintiff still must show that she is 
“aggrieved.”61 For now, the standard seems to be—in federal 
56. See generally Spade v. Select Comfort Corp, 181 A.3d 969 (2018); O’Donnell &
Baker, supra note 56. 
57. Spade, 181 A.3d at 978, 981.
58. Dugan, 171 A.3d at 647.
59. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-17 (West 2018).
60. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016) (quoting Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)) (emphasis deleted). 
61. Transcript of Opinion on Motion to Dismiss at 6, Russell v. Croscill Home, LLC, 
2016 WL 6571287 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2016) (No. 16-cv-1190 (PGS)). 
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court—that bare procedural violations are not sufficient to make 
a TCCWNA claim.63  This means that the mere inclusion of 
harmful language that violates consumer rights may be 
insufficient to state a claim despite the clear language of the 
statute indicating that the mere inclusion of such phrases itself 
constitutes the harm.62 At least in state court, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has decided—somewhat confusingly—that some 
amount of harm must be shown, even if that harm cannot warrant 
an award of damages, in order for a plaintiff be an aggrieved 
consumer entitled to recovery under the TCCWNA.63 If this 
interpretation persists, many consumers may be unable to enforce 
their rights as contemplated by the legislature. 
b. Clearly Established Legal Right or Responsibility
More information is available concerning what clearly 
established legal rights will suffice to establish a TCCWNA 
claim, but the scope of this terminology is the primary issue that 
the New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to answer in the Spade 
case.64  However, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not directly 
define clearly established legal rights in a manner that can provide 
guidance for future cases—it merely stated that “the TCCWNA 
[recognizes] an affirmative violation of N.J.A.C. 13:45A–5.3(c), 
by virtue of the inclusion of language prohibited by that 
regulation in a contract of sale or sale order for the delivery of 
household furniture, to constitute a violation of a ‘clearly 
established legal right’ . . . .”65 Currently, New Jersey courts have 
determined, and not helpfully so, that deciding whether a seller 
63 Hite v. Lush Internet, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 444, 454-55 (D.N.J. 2017), appeal docketed, 
No. 17-1907 (3d Cir. Apr. 21, 2017). 
62. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 638 (3rd
Cir. 2017); Hite, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 455; see also Rubin v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., No. 16-
2167(FLW), 2017 WL 1170854, at *1-3 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2017); Statement, supra note 34, 
at 2-3. See Wright v. Bank of Am., No. A-2358-15T3, 2018 WL 4779028, at *2 (N.J. super. 
Ct. App. Div. Oct. 4, 2018) for further discussion of tension surrounding the definition of an 
“aggrieved consumer.”  
63. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
64. Spade v. Select Comfort Corp, 181 A.3d 969, 981 (2018).
65. Id.
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has violated a clearly established responsibility of their own or 
legal right of a consumer will be a case-specific inquiry that will 
result in differing outcomes based on the “timing of the offer, 
contract, or warranty.”66  The statement accompanying the 
TCCWNA bill provides examples of provisions that violate 
clearly established legal rights of consumers, including: 
[T]hose [provisions] that deceptively claim that a seller or
lessor is not responsible for any damages caused to a
consumer, even when such damages are the result of the
seller’s or lessor’s negligence.  These provisions provide that
the consumer assumes all risks and responsibilities, and
even agrees to defend, indemnify and hold harmless the
seller from all liability.  Other provisions claim that a lessor
has the right to cancel the consumer contract without cause
and to repossess its rental equipment from the consumer’s
premises without liability for trespass.  Still other provisions
arbitrarily assert the consumer cannot cancel the contract for
any cause without punitive forfeiture of deposits and
payment of unfounded damages.  Also, the consumer’s rights
to due process is often denied by deceptive provisions by
which he allegedly waives his right to receive legal notices,
waives process of law in the repossession of merchandise
and waives his right to retain certain property exempted by
State or Federal law from a creditor’s reach.67
In addition to the provisions named in the statement 
accompanying the bill, the New Jersey courts have noted several 
other statutes enforcing consumer rights potentially qualifying as 
“clearly established legal rights” for the purposes of the 
TCCWNA.  These statutes include the Retail Installment Sales 
Act (“RISA”),68 the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 
(“MMWA”),69 the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act,70 the 
66. Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc. 171 A.3d 620, 647 (N.J. 2017).
67. Statement, supra note 34, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
68. United Consumer Fin. Servs. Co. v. Carbo, 982 A.2d 7, 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2009). 
69. Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 70 A.3d 544, 553 (N.J. 2013). 
70. Martinez-Santiago v. Pub. Storage, 38 F. Supp. 3d 500, 505 (D.N.J. 2014) (ruling
that plaintiff stated a claim for TCCWNA violation where a contract impermissibly 
shortened the Consumer Fraud Act’s statute of limitations). 
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Products Liability Act,71 the Punitive Damages Act,72 the 
Uniform Commercial Code,73 the Nursing Home Act,74 the New 
Jersey Gift Certificate Statute,75 the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act,76 and New Jersey Statutes sections 2A:44-189, 
which pertain to rental agreements with limits upon the value of 
stored property and the remedies that accompany it.77  The 
voluntary waiver of a legal right does not constitute a violation 
under the TCCWNA.78 
This element of a TCCWNA claim appears to be the biggest 
barrier for consumers, especially when seeking to pursue class 
actions.  The trend of New Jersey courts is to deny the TCCWNA 
claims by refusing to certify the class79 or dismiss the case 
primarily on policy grounds that the scope of the TCCWNA will 
result in penalties against the businesses that are exorbitant.80 
D. Online Terms and Conditions and the TCCWNA
The primary focus of recent litigation under the 
TCCWNA concerns online terms and conditions or terms of 
service offered by sellers to consumers before they make their 
71. See generally Hite v. Lush Internet, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 444 (D.N.J. 2017) appeal
docketed, No. 17-1907 (3d Cir. Apr. 21, 2017); Transcript of Opinion on Motion to Dismiss, 
supra note 62. 
72. Hite, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 447; Transcript of Opinion on Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 62. 
73. Id.
74. Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill, 43 A.3d 1197, 1199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2012). 
75. Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 70 A.3d 544, 547 (N.J. 2013). 
76. Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offs. P.C., 777 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (D.N.J. 2011).
77. Castro v. Sovran Self Storage, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 204, 211 (D.N.J. 2015).
78. Salvadori v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 2d 349, 355 (D.N.J. 2006).
79. Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc. 171 A.3d 620, 640, 643 (N.J. 2017) (failing to meet
the predominance requirement because of the different individualized harm that may result 
from TCCWNA violations); see also Mellet v. Aquasid, LLC, 171 A.3d 207, 208-09 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).   
80. Rubin v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., No. 16-2167(FLW), 2017 WL 1170854, at *21-22
(D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2017); Dugan, 171 A.3d at 650 (“Nothing in the legislative history of the 
TCCWNA, which focuses on sellers’ inclusion of legally invalid or unenforceable provisions 
in consumer contracts, suggests that when the Legislature enacted the statute, it intended to 
impose billion-dollar penalties on restaurants that serve unpriced food and beverages to 
customers.”). 
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purchases.81  These cases have outlined a few helpful boundaries 
in determining the scope of the TCCWNA in the 2000s.  While a 
few companies have attempted to comply with the TCCWNA, it 
is uncertain at this time whether these terms and conditions will 
actually be enforced by the courts as there have been no rulings 
that state what precisely is required of sellers to comply with the 
TCCWNA.82 
As for arbitration clauses, it is questionable whether these 
will violate the TCCWNA, and their enforceability will likely 
depend on how the arbitration clauses are phrased.83  Regarding 
jurisdictional limitations, courts have held that contractual 
provisions that “‘purport only to be coextensive of the laws of’ 
the state, or merely state that they are permitted to the maximum 
amount or extent as permitted by state law, do not violate a clearly 
81. See, e.g., Hite v. Lush Internet, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 444 (D.N.J. 2017).
82.  See Terms of Use, STANLEY BLACK & DECKER, 
http://www.stanleyblackanddecker.com/terms-use [https://perma.cc/UZ39-A9TD] (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2018) (“LEGAL NOTICE FOR NEW JERSEY RESIDENTS . . . the 
following provisions of these Terms shall not be applicable to New Jersey residents: (1) in 
the Disclaimer of Warranties and Limitation of Liability section, (a) the provision concerning 
limiting our liability for any loss or damage is not applicable to New Jersey residents to the 
extent we were negligent or have breached our obligation to you, and (b) the provision 
concerning the exclusion or limitation of certain damages is not applicable to New Jersey 
residents with respect to punitive damages, loss of data, and loss of or damage to property; 
(2) in the Comments, Communications and Other Content section, the provision concerning
the indemnification by you is not applicable to New Jersey residents unless you were
negligent or have breached these Terms; and (3) in the Disputes section, (a) the provisions
which limit the time within which claims against us must be brought, and (b) the provision
concerning the exclusion or limitation of certain damages is not applicable to New Jersey
residents with respect to punitive damages, loss of data, and loss of or damage to property.”);
Terms and Conditions, STANLEY ENGINEERED FASTENING,
http://www.infastech.com/en/Services/Legals/Terms-and-Conditions
[https://perma.cc/C6P6-KGQR] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018); Terms and Conditions,
STANTT, https://stantt.com/pages/terms-and-conditions [https://perma.cc/EZF8-GBBY]
(last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
83. See Salvadori v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 2d 349, 355 (D.N.J. 2006)
(holding that an arbitration agreement did not violate any clearly established legal right, and 
thus could not form the basis of a TCCWNA claim); Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Group, 99 
A.3d 306, 315 (N.J. 2014) (holding that that an arbitration clause was unenforceable because
the clause needed to state in clear and unambiguous terms that the plaintiff is waiving her
right to seek relief in court for a breach of her statutory rights). The plaintiff in Atalese
asserted that the arbitration clause violated the TCCWNA. Id. However, the court has not
yet decided the issue as the case was remanded and the court has made no subsequent
decision as of now. Id.
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established right.”84  Courts have also held that phrases such as 
“where permitted by law” or “unless prohibited by law” are not 
in violation of the TCCWNA because they do not represent an 
attempt by the seller to “deceive the Plaintiff or obscure his rights, 
responsibilities, or remedies.”85 
In defining what jurisdictional statements violate the 
TCCWNA, courts have held that a clause does not trigger the 
TCCWNA’s Section 1686 where the “language merely represents 
an ‘attempt by the drafter to conform to New Jersey laws,’” but 
that “where the savings provision could be interpreted to imply 
that some terms of the contract may be unenforceable in some 
jurisdictions,” courts have held that Section 16 is triggered.87  
While a provision does not need to “unequivocally express that 
some provisions may be unenforceable to trigger the specification 
requirement of Section 16,” sellers need to be cognizant of the 
appropriate terminology and careful in crafting their terms and 
conditions.88 Some courts have found that terms may implicitly 
comply with or violate the TCCWNA’s Section 16 even in the 
absence of specific language addressing the topic.89  “In other 
words, a contract or notice cannot simply state in a general, 
nonparticularized fashion that some of the provisions of the 
84. Walters v. Dream Cars Nat’l, L.L.C., 2016 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 498 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. 2016) (“The TCCWNA is not triggered merely because a consumer, unfamiliar 
with New Jersey law, cannot discern with certainty how far a provision extends . . . ‘[A 
provision’s] language might give an inattentive reader the wrong impression about the law, 
if the reader skips over . . . limiting phrases’, such as ‘to the fullest extent permitted by law’ 
or ‘as is permitted by law’, however, that is not grounds for a Section 15 violation.”) 
(alteration in original).  
85. Id. at *2, *7.
86. “No consumer contract, warranty, notice or sign, as provided for in this act, shall
contain any provision by which the consumer waives his rights under this act. Any such 
provision shall be null and void. No consumer contract, notice or sign shall state that any of 
its provisions is or may be void, unenforceable or inapplicable in some jurisdictions without 
specifying which provisions are or are not void, unenforceable or inapplicable within the 
State of New Jersey; provided, however, that this shall not apply to warranties.” N.J. STAT. 
ANN. 56:12-16 (West 2018).  
87. Kendall v. Cubesmart L.P., No. 15-6098(FLW)(LHG), 2016 WL 1597245, at *9
(D. N.J. April 21, 2016) (quoting Martina v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, No. 12-2063, 2012 WL 
3822093, at *4 (D. N.J. Sept. 4, 2012)).  
88. Id.
89. Id.
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contract or notice may be void, inapplicable, or unenforceable in 
some states.”90 
E. Illustrative Case: Rubin v. J. Crew Group
Rubin provides valuable guidance in the line of recent 
TCCWNA litigation because it represents the typical claims 
consumers assert against sellers’ online terms and conditions.91  
The case also highlights the problem of defining what constitutes 
an “aggrieved consumer.”  In Rubin, the consumer-plaintiff 
brought a putative class action in federal court against the online 
clothing retailer J. Crew.92  The focus of the suit concerned two 
provisions in J. Crew’s online terms and conditions offered in 
order to complete a sale, specifically the limitation of liability 
clause93 and an indemnification clause94 that allegedly violated 
the TCCWNA by “obscur[ing] the effects of its disclaimers on 
New Jersey [consumers].”95  The plaintiff alleged that the terms 
and conditions prevented the consumer “from (1) ‘seeking 
90. Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 70 A.3d 544, 549 (N.J. 2013). 
91. Rubin v. J. Crew Group, Inc., No. 16-2167(FLW), 2017 WL 1170854, at *1 (D. 
N.J. March 29, 2017). 
92. Id.
93. Id. at *1-2 (“IN NO EVENT SHALL J.CREW . . . BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR 
ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL,
EXEMPLARY OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES, LOSSES OR CAUSES OF ACTION 
(WHETHER IN CONTRACT OR TORT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, 
NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING FROM OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO 
THE USE OF, OR THE INABILITY TO USE, OR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SITE 
OR THE CONTENT AND MATERIALS OR FUNCTIONALITY ON OR ACCESSED 
THROUGH THE SITE, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, LOSS OF REVENUE, 
OR ANTICIPATED PROFITS, OR LOST BUSINESS, DATA OR SALES OR ANY 
OTHER TYPE OF DAMAGE, TANGIBLE OR INTANGIBLE IN NATURE, EVEN IF
J.CREW OR ITS REPRESENTATIVE OR SUCH INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ADVISED 
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT 
ALLOW THIS LIMITATION OR EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY, SO SOME OF THE 
ABOVE LIMITATIONS MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU.”).
94. Id. (“You agree to defend, indemnify and hold J.Crew . . . harmless from any and
all claims, liabilities, damages, costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, in 
any way arising from, related to or in connection with your use of the Site, your violation of 
the Terms or the posting or transmission of any materials on or through the Site by you, 
including, but not limited to, any third-party claim that any information or materials you 
provide infringes any third-party proprietary right.”).  
95. Id. at *3.
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punitive damage awards for damage incurred’; (2) ‘seeking 
redress for violations of their internet commerce rights’; and (3) 
‘pursuing any damages, including treble and statutory damages, 
attorney’s fees and costs for any illegal actions engaged in by 
Defendant on its website.’”96  Finally, the plaintiff alleged that the 
inclusion of the provision “SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT 
ALLOW THIS LIMITATION OR EXCLUSION OF 
LIABILITY, SO SOME OF THE ABOVE LIMITATIONS 
MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU” violated Section 16 of the 
TCCWNA.97 
The court dismissed plaintiff’s claim based on Spokeo,98 
which requires that “a plaintiff must claim the invasion of a 
concrete and particularized legally protected interest resulting in 
harm that is actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.”99  The court stated that “[p]laintiff seems to suggest 
that language, e.g., Terms and Conditions on the Website, that 
violates a statute is actionable, because its mere presence causes 
injury—regardless of whether she has seen it, read it, or suffered 
the effects of it.  This is exactly the type of non-particularized and 
hypothetical injury against which Spokeo cautioned.”100  Based 
on this reasoning, the plaintiff did not meet the requirement for 
Article III standing.101  However, because the court dismissed the 
case based on Article III standing, it never reached the question 
of whether the plaintiff was an aggrieved consumer under the 
TCCWNA, nor how that would interact with the Spokeo standing 
requirements.102  Delivering a final punch, the court stated: 
The Court is aware that there are numerous class actions filed 
in this district based upon similar TCCWNA violations 
alleged in this case . . . the passage of the Act is not intended, 
however, for litigation-seeking plaintiffs and/or their counsel 
96. Rubin, 2017 WL 1170854, at *2. 
97. Id.
98. Id. at *3–5. 
99. Id. at *2 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016)).
100. Id. at *7. 
101. Rubin, 2017 WL 1170854, at *7. 
102. Id. at *8.
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to troll the internet to find potential violations under the 
TCCWNA without any underlying harm.103 
However, this interpretation seems to be contradictory to the plain 
language of the statute, which claims that the mere inclusion of 
such provisions violates the TCCWNA.104 
PART II: THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF 
STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES 
To provide guidance for the New Jersey courts regarding 
how best to interpret the TCCWNA and to the New Jersey 
legislature regarding potential amendment of the statute to 
accommodate consumer protection needs in the age of 
technology, a review of existing consumer protection statutes, the 
levels of protection they afford, and their effectiveness in 
enforcing consumer protection would be helpful.  This section 
will outline those factors that contribute to a strong consumer 
protection statute,105 those factors that lead to a weak consumer 
protection statute,106 and provide an example of a California 
statute that arguably exemplifies an almost ideal level of 
protection and supports the need for modification of the 
TCCWNA.107  This article will then apply this analysis to the 
TCCWNA in order to determine the areas in which the statute 
could be improved. 
A. CLASSIFICATION OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION STATUTES 
To classify consumer protection statutes according to the 
level of protection they afford to consumers, a framework of 
analysis would be helpful.  In reviewing consumer protection 
statutes, specifically state versions of the Uniform Deceptive Acts 
103. Id.
104. Statement, supra note 34.
105. See infra Part II.A.
106. See infra Part II.A.
107. See infra Part II.B.
2019 REVAMPING THE RIGHT 1017 
or Practices, several factors contribute to bolstering consumer 
rights.  But despite their intent to protect consumers, many states’ 
consumer protection statutes unfortunately are not effective in 
practice for several reasons discussed below. 
Strong state consumer protection statutes generally 
include provisions that allow consumers to enforce their rights 
with ease against businesses that attempt to mislead or otherwise 
dissuade consumers from suing.  The factors and provisions 
include: 
• “[B]road, general prohibitions against both deceptive
conduct and unfair conduct”;
• The absence of a requirement that the consumer prove
the seller acted willfully or with knowledge of the
deceptive conduct;
• Provisions that grant a consumer with a private right of
action against a business;
• Provisions that allow for the granting of rule-making
authority to state agencies;
• Provisions that apply to a number of industries, without
many exceptions;
• Provisions that make available a number of remedies
(restitution, civil penalties, and/or equitable relief);
• Provisions that allow recovery of punitive damages and
attorney’s fees; and
• Provisions that allow class actions.108
While no one state consumer protection statute contains
all of these factors, the more factors a statute includes, the more 
likely it is that the statute is effective in its goal of consumer 
protection.  Many strong state consumer protection statutes 
substantially mirror the Federal Trade Commission Act.109 
Conversely, weak state consumer statutes contain 
provisions that lead to the prevention of consumer litigation 
108. See Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); CAROLYN
L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES
10–12, 14–19, 22–23 (2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4L43-2J3B].
109. See CARTER, supra note 110, at 11. 
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against sellers for deceptive practices.  The factors and provisions 
that weak state consumer protection statutes contain include: 
• A short and specific list of acts that will constitute
deceptive conduct for purposes of the statute;
• The requirement that the consumer prove the seller acted
willfully or with knowledge of the deceptive conduct;
• Provisions that prevent a consumer himself from
bringing litigation against the seller; do not grant
rulemaking authorities to state agencies;
• Provisions that make exceptions to the statute for
numerous industries, rendering the statute unenforceable
against the majority of sellers;
• Provisions that substantially limit the remedies available
to the consumer;
• Provisions that erect “special barriers” to litigation
against the consumer, such as a requirement of prior
notice to the seller or business;
• The absence of a provision permitting recovery of
attorney’s fees or punitive damages;
• Provisions that place the burden of paying the seller’s
attorney’s fees on the consumer;
• Provisions that bar class action litigation;
• Provisions that require proof of a negative public impact;
and
• Provisions that require proof of the consumer’s reliance
on the deceptive conduct.110
An additional consideration in classifying state consumer 
protection statutes as either strong or weak is the scope of conduct 
the statutes purport to regulate.  While all state consumer 
protection statutes target deceptive practices generally, the states 
vary in whether the statutes protect against unconscionable, 
unfair, or both unfair and unconscionable conduct.111  A majority 
of state consumer protection statutes regulate only unfair 
conduct.112  Regulating unfair conduct results in relatively strong 
consumer protection statutes because the “unfairness doctrine” 
allows for states to develop their definition of the term “by the 
110. Id. at 5, 7. 
111. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 16, at app. 3B.
112. Id. Twenty-seven states regulate unfair conduct. Id.
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gradual process of inclusion and exclusion, through which they 
may ‘discover and make explicit those unexpressed standards of 
fair dealing which the conscience of the community may 
progressively develop.’”113  Therefore, “even lawful acts may be 
scrutinized in consumers’ actions . . . .”114  A significant minority 
of states either do not specifically target unfair or unconscionable 
conduct or only regulate unconscionable conduct.115  Finally, ten 
states and the District of Columbia regulate both unconscionable 
and unfair conduct under the same consumer protection statute.116 
B. STRONG CONSUMER PROTECTION
STATUTES—CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE § 1770 
The California Legal Remedies Act is incredibly broad in 
its scope and application, and it represents one of the strongest 
consumer protection statutes among the fifty states.117  The 
statute, in relevant part, provides: 
The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a 
transaction intended to result or that results in the sale or 
lease of goods or services to any consumer are unlawful . . . 
.118 
In looking at the factors that make a strong consumer protection 
statute, California’s statute represents the inclusion of nearly all 
the factors.119  California’s consumer protection statute contains 
a specific list of acts that will constitute deceptive and unfair 
conduct; the list is extensive and enumerates over twenty-five 
separate actions that fall under the scope of the act.120  
113. See Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 9, at 536 (internal quotations omitted).
114. Id. at 537.
115. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 16, at app. 3B. Five states do not specifically
target unfair or unsociable conduct (Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
and Virginia). Id. Six states regulate only unconscionable conduct (Alabama, Arkansas, 
Kansas, New Jersey, Texas, and Utah). Id. 
116. Id.
117. CARTER, supra note 110, at 24.
118. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770(a)(14) (West 2018).
119. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770(a)(14).
120. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 2018).
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Additionally, any conduct not covered by this section of the act is 
covered by California’s Unfair Competition Law, which “broadly 
prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices and 
deceptive advertising.”121  Furthermore, California’s Unlawful 
Acts and Practices statute does not require that the consumer 
prove the seller acted willfully, but only with a tendency to 
deceive.122 It provides a consumer or the attorney general with the 
power to sue the seller even in the form of a class action,123 does 
not limit the industries that may be sued (other than excluding 
advertising mediums),124 and allows for the recovery of a variety 
of damages and relief (including restitution and punitive 
damages).125 
While the California Legal Remedies Act is 
demonstrative of a robust consumer protection statute, it contains 
a barrier that may make it difficult for consumers to bring 
litigation against sellers.  Namely, the act requires the consumer 
to provide the seller with notice “thirty days or more prior to the 
commencement of [the] action,” with a “[d]emand that the person 
correct, repair, replace, or otherwise rectify” the infringement of 
the consumer’s rights.126  Adding these requirements for bringing 
a suit may dissuade some consumers from enforcing their 
rights.127 
121. CARTER, supra note 110, at 24; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2018).
122. CAL CIV. CODE § 1770(a).
123. CAL CIV. CODE § 1752 (West 2018).
124. CAL CIV. CODE § 1755 (West 2018).
125. CAL CIV. CODE § 1780 (West 2018).
126. CAL CIV. CODE § 1782(a)(2) (West 2018).
127. For an example of a weak state consumer protection statute, see COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 6-1-105, -109 (West 2018), which, beyond providing very limited options for 
recovering damages and what constitutes unfair or deceptive practices, also requires 
consumers to show that the deceptive conduct “‘significantly impacts the public as actual or 
potential consumers of the defendant’s goods, services, or property.’” Henson v. Bank of 
Am., 935 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1142 (D. Colo. 2013) (quoting Rhino Linings USA, Inc. v. 
Rocky Mountain Rhino Lining, Inc., 62 P.3d 142, 149 (Colo. 2003)). 
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PART III: DRAFTING EFFECTIVE CONSUMER 
PROTECTION STATUTES 
A. ANALYZING THE TCCWNA
The TCCWNA represents one of the strongest and most 
pervasive consumer protection statutes—at least in regard to its 
plain language.  While the statute does not directly address 
unconscionable and unfair conduct,128 the language of the 
statute’s legislative history suggests that it applies broadly to all 
deceptive conduct.129  The TCCWNA does not require the 
consumer to show that the seller was aware that its conduct was 
deceptive.130  Instead, the TCCWNA states that the mere 
inclusion of deceptive terms constitutes a violation of the act.131  
The statute allows the consumer a private right of action and is 
broadly applicable to all sellers, lessors, creditors, and bailees.132  
Additionally, the remedies available under the TCCWNA are 
extensive, including a civil penalty, actual damages, attorney’s 
fees, and court costs, all of which are “in addition to and 
cumulative of any other . . . remedy . . . accorded by common 
law, Federal law or statutes of this State . . . .”133  Furthermore, 
the TCCWNA does not list specific illegal conduct. 
While the TCCWNA is among the stronger consumer 
protection statutes, it is still subject to some limitations that are 
significant weaknesses.  First, the TCCWNA explicitly states that 
it does not create new substantive rights.134  Secondly, the 
TCCWNA’s only stated goal is to target deceptive conduct rather 
128. This is presumably the case because the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act covers
unconscionable conduct, and the TCWNNA was created as an extension of the CFA in order 
to fill in the gaps the CFA left in consumer protection. Statement, supra note 34; N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 56:8-2 (1967). 
129. Smerling v. Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., No. A-4937-13T3, 2016 WL 4717997, at *3
(N.J. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 2016). 
130. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:12-15, -16 (West 2018).
131. Statement, supra note 34.
132. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-17.
133. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-18.
134. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-18.
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than unfair, unconscionable, or conduct that does a disservice to 
consumers.135 
B. FUNCTIONAL CONSUMER PROTECTION
STATUTES 
In order for state consumer protection statutes to be 
effective, particularly in regard to online terms, two requirements 
must be met.  First, sellers must comply with statutory 
requirements.  Second, consumers must read and comprehend the 
contract terms.  Regarding the first, one noted scholar, Professor 
Whitford of the University of Wisconsin, has provided a 
framework for encouraging sellers to fulfill the first requirement.  
With regard to the second, several psychological studies provide 
guidance for drafting terms designed to fulfill the requirement 
that terms be read and comprehended by consumers.136 
1. Whitford Framework for Encouraging Seller
Compliance 
The Whitford framework hypothesizes a set of factors that 
induce sellers to comply with consumer protection laws.137  The 
framework assumes that sellers utilize cost-benefit analyses when 
determining whether they will comply with a consumer protection 
statute.138  The cost-benefit analysis considers economic harm 
that may directly result from non-compliance as well as 
135. See Statement, supra note 34.
136. This article will not address the second requirement focusing on the consumer’s
role in effectuating consumer protection statutes and instead will focus on how best to 
motivate seller compliance. This might be done via the implementation of model disclosure 
forms and clauses issued by the New Jersey legislature similar to those issued by the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Federal Reserve Board for Regulation Z. See 
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 1026 apps. G, H (2018). 
137. Jean Braucher & Angela Littwin, Examination as a Method of Consumer
Protection, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 33, 36 (2016). 
138. Id.
2019 REVAMPING THE RIGHT 1023 
reputational damage and cognitive dissonance.139  Whitford’s 
framework consists of three conclusions. 
First, “that more specific statutes would produce greater 
compliance [because] . . . vague standards create unworkable 
precedent and allow companies to give themselves the benefit of 
the doubt regarding the legality of their practices, thereby 
minimizing the reputational and psychological costs of 
noncompliance.”140  Creating more specific standards and 
including a statement of purpose provides “concrete commands 
to engender compliance.”141 
Second, sellers consider costs in both their direct (costs of 
legal compliance) and indirect (revenue lost via compliance with 
laws) capacities, meaning that statutes must ensure that the costs 
of compliance do not dis-incentivize sellers from abiding by 
consumer protection laws.142 
Third, legislatures need to pay particular attention to 
remedies143 when drafting consumer protection statutes because 
“penalties for violating consumer protection laws [are] not high 
enough to compensate for the fact that so few consumers 
[sue].”144  Because the traditional route of remedies are not an 
effective method of remedying harm to consumers,145 Whitford 
suggests that public enforcement is the “only viable alternative,” 
meaning that administrative agencies—rather than consumers—
are the most likely actors to produce seller compliance.146  Even 
though public enforcement has the best chance at inducing 
compliance, Whitford notes that “the effectiveness of public 
139. Id.
140. Id. at 37.
141. Id. at 45.
142. Braucher & Littwin, supra note 139, at 36-37.
143. Id. at 37.
144. Id. One proposed solution to the compensation issue is “effective private
enforcement” under UDAP statutes that “can be expected to eliminate the gap between the 
inherent limitations on FTC efforts and the needs of aggrieved consumers,” which “thus 
[offer] the best deterrent against wrongdoing in the marketplace.” Leaffer & Lipson, supra 
note 6, at 521, 555. 
145. Remedies in consumer protection actions, especially actual damages, can be
difficult to calculate, especially where the damage is merely the presentation or inclusion of 
deceptive terms. Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 9, at 546-47. 
146. Braucher & Littwin, supra note 139, at 48.
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enforcement will depend in large part on the agency’s 
commitment to legal compliance.”147 
2. An Effective Framework
As indicated, therefore, incentivizing sellers to comply 
with consumer protection statutes and encouraging consumers to 
read contract terms seems to be the best approach for drafting 
effective consumer protection statutes.  Taking the strengths and 
weaknesses of existing consumer protection statutes148 into 
consideration is essential to this endeavor as well.  Thus, the 
following factors are critical in ensuring an effective consumer 
protection statute. 
First, the New Jersey legislature should draft a specifically 
worded statute that applies broadly to unfair, unconscionable, and 
deceptive trade practices.  It is important to note that “broadly” 
does not mean “vaguely” in this context.  A statute may have a 
broad scope while still containing specific language detailing 
which practices are unlawful.  For example, a good consumer 
protection statute will contain: 
• A statement providing that unconscionable, unfair149,
and deceptive conduct is unlawful;150 and
• A comprehensive itemized list of specific unlawful,
unfair, and deceptive conduct, with a provision that
holds any unlisted conduct that amounts to
unconscionable or unfair conduct is unlawful.151
147. Id.
148. See supra Part II.A..
149. Regulating unfair conduct may be the most important aspect of a consumer
protection statute to effectuate the broadest protection, as an innumerable amount of 
practices may fall under its scope. Regulating unfair conduct may come in the form of stating 
that “(1) [whether an act,] without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, 
offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—
whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, 
or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, 
or unscrupulous; [or] (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers.” Leaffer & 
Lipson, supra note 9, at 537. 
150. Id.
151. Id. at 535.
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This will provide broad protection to consumers while still 
providing clear guidelines to the seller.  Additionally, and 
importantly, consumer protection statutes should meet the 
standard applied by the FTC.  That is, deceptive trade practices 
“need only have a potential to create deception in the minds of 
consumers or business competitors” rather than require that the 
consumer be “actually deceived.”152  This standard protects the 
consumer from the actualization of the harm.153  While the 
potential for sellers to find loopholes will always exist, this 
method affords consumers the most protection while holding the 
seller accountable. 
Second, the legislature should lower barriers to consumer 
suits and impose stricter penalties on sellers who do not 
comply.154  The consumer protection statute should permit a 
private right of action, allow for punitive and higher civil 
damages rather than capping the remedies available or amount 
recoverable,155 and permit class actions.  Companies will thus 
have greater incentives to comply.  This approach permits 
consumers to enforce their rights with minimal hassle.  The 
breakdown of barriers to litigation should also increase the cost 
of noncompliance, further incentivizing compliance.  The 
legislature should also seek to broaden the remedies available to 
consumers and administrative agencies (allowing equitable, 
injunctive, and civil penalties).156 
3. General Redrafting Suggestions for TCCWNA
In rewriting the TCCWNA or drafting consumer 
protection legislation specifically designed to address online 
terms and conditions, the New Jersey legislature should 
152. Karns, supra note 2, at 382.
153. Id.
154. Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 6, at 547 (“In . . . cases in which proof of the extent
of a consumer’s loss is difficult, the courts’ use of reasonable inferences in connection with 
minimum damages provisions will make consumer actions feasible.”).  
155. Id. at 532.
156. Braucher & Littwin, supra note 139, at 48; Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 9, at 
523-24. 
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implement strong provisions preventing sellers from continuing 
their deceptive practices, as well as ensure that consumers 
actually engage with online terms.  Rather than seeking to limit 
consumer protection by increasing barriers to litigation—as does 
one bill recently proposed to amend the TCCWNA157—the New 
Jersey legislature should remember that both the federal 
government—via the FTC Act—and all states endorse greater 
consumer protection.158 
Amending the TCCWNA or constructing a new statute, 
while harsh on businesses, will also benefit sellers by allowing 
them to clearly understand what is required of them to comply 
with the statute.  The failure to set forth specifications as to 
compliance in the TCCWNA as it stands reduces the incentive for 
businesses to amend their terms and conditions so that New Jersey 
residents are aware of their rights.  If the businesses attempt to 
comply, but do so inadequately, they still suffer the same 
penalties as those that make no attempt at compliance.159 
4. Suggested Amendment
In order to effectuate the strong consumer protection 
power that the New Jersey legislature originally intended, the 
following amendments to the TCCWNA are suggested in italics: 
New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and 
Notice Act 
No seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee shall in the course 
of his business offer to any consumer or prospective 
consumer or enter into any written consumer contract or give 
or display any written consumer warranty, notice or sign 
after the effective date of this act which includes any 
provision that violates any clearly established legal right of 
157. Proposed Bill 2016 Bill N.J. A.B. 4121, if passed, will require “ascertainable
economic loss” in order to achieve class certification, which fundamentally conflicts with 
the TCCWNA’s statement that the mere inclusion of such deceptive terms is what constitutes 
the harm, and will put into place a procedural system in which the consumer will need to 
first request reimbursement from the seller, effectively erecting a new and difficult barrier to 
consumer protection. Gen. Assemb. 4121, 217th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2016). 
158. Karns, supra note 2, at 375.
159. Braucher & Littwin, supra note 139, at 59-60
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a consumer or responsibility of a seller, lessor, creditor, 
lender or bailee as established by State or Federal law at the 
time the offer is made or the consumer contract is signed or 
the warranty, notice or sign is given or displayed.  Any 
contract, warranty, notice or sign that is displayed on a 
seller’s website or other online location shall be covered by 
this act.  The mere inclusion in a contract, warranty, notice 
or sign of these terms is sufficient for a consumer to bring a 
cause of action under this act, even absent other harm. 
A seller violates a clearly established legal right or fails to 
fulfill their responsibility as a seller—and will be considered 
either unfair methods of competition, unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices, or unconscionable—when any of the 
following occurs: 
a)Passing off goods or services as those of another;
b)Misrepresenting the source, sponsorship, approval, or
certification of goods or services;
c)Misrepresenting the affiliation, connection, or
association with, or certification by, another;
d)Using deceptive representations or designations of
geographic origin in connection with goods or services;
e)Representing that goods or services have sponsorship,
approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or
quantities that they do not have or that a person has a
sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection
that he or she does not have;
f)Representing that goods are original or new if they have
deteriorated unreasonably or are altered, reconditioned,
reclaimed, used, or secondhand;
g)Representing that goods or services are of a particular
standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a
particular style or model, if they are of another;
h)Disparaging the goods, services, or business of another
by false or misleading representation of fact;
i)Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them
as advertised;
j)Advertising goods or services with intent not to supply
reasonably expectable demand, unless the advertisement
discloses a limitation of quantity;
k)Advertising furniture without clearly indicating that it
is unassembled if that is the case;
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l)Advertising the price of unassembled furniture without
clearly indicating that the assembled price of that
furniture if the same furniture is available assembled from
the seller;
m)Making false or misleading statements of fact
concerning reasons for, existence of, or amounts of, price
reductions;
n)Representing that a transaction confers or involves
rights, remedies, or obligations that it does not have or
involve, or that are prohibited by law;
o)Representing that a part, placement, or repair service
is needed when it is not;
p)Representing that the subject of a transaction has been
supplied in accordance with a previous representation
when it has not;
q)Representing that the consumer will receive a rebate,
discount, or other economic benefit, if the earning of the
benefit is contingent on an event to occur subsequent to
the consummation of the transaction;
r)Misrepresenting the authority of a salesperson,
representative, or agent to negotiate the final terms of a
transaction with a consumer;
s)Inserting an unconscionable provision in the contract;
t)Advertising that a product is being offered at a specific
price plus a specific percentage of that price unless (i) the
total price is set forth in the advertisement, which may
include, but is not limited to, shelf tags, displays, and
media advertising, in a size larger than any other price in
that advertisement, and (ii) the specific price plus a
specific percentage of that price represents a markup
from the seller’s costs or from the wholesale price of the
product.160
Consumer means any individual who buys, leases, borrows, 
or bails any money, property or service which is primarily 
for personal, family or household purposes.  The provisions 
of this act shall not apply to residential leases or to the sale 
of real estate, whether improved or not, or to the construction 
of new homes subject to “The New Home Warranty and 
160. CAL CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 2018).
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Builders’ Registration Act,” P.L.1977, c. 467 (C. 46:3B-1 et 
seq.).161 
No consumer contract, warranty, notice or sign, as provided 
for in this act, shall contain any provision by which the 
consumer waives his rights under this act.  Any such 
provision shall be null and void.  No consumer contract, 
notice or sign shall state that any of its provisions is or may 
be void, unenforceable or inapplicable in some jurisdictions 
without specifying which provisions are or are not void, 
unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New 
Jersey; provided, however, that this shall not apply to 
warranties.162  Examples of such provisions include 
provisions which provide that the consumer assumes all risk 
and responsibilities, and even agrees to defend, indemnify 
and hold harmless the seller from all liability.  Other 
provisions claim that a lessor has the right to cancel the 
consumer contract without cause and to repossess its rental 
equipment from the consumer’s premises without liability for 
trespass.  Still other provisions arbitrarily assert the 
consumer cannot cancel the contract for any cause without 
punitive forfeiture of deposits and payment of unfounded 
damages.  Also, the consumer’s rights to due process is often 
denied by deceptive provision by which he allegedly waives 
his right to receive legal notices, waives process of law in 
the repossession of merchandise and waives his right to 
retain certain property exempted by State or Federal law 
from a creditor’s reach.163 
Any person who violates the provisions of this act shall be 
liable to the aggrieved consumer for: 
a)Actual damages, but in no case shall the total award of
damages in a class action be no less than one thousand
dollars ($1000);
b)An order enjoining the methods, acts, or practices;
c)Restitution of property;
d)Punitive damages;
161. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-15 (West 2018).
162. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-16.
163. Statement, supra note 34, at 2-3.
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e)Any other relief the court deems proper.164
This may be recoverable by the consumer in a civil 
action in a court of competent jurisdiction or as 
part of a counterclaim by the consumer against the 
seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee or assignee 
of any of the aforesaid, who aggrieved him.  A 
consumer also shall have the right to petition the 
court to terminate a contract which violates the 
provisions of section 2 of this act and the court in 
its discretion may void the contract.  Nothing in 
this act shall limit any other statutory or common 
law rights of the Attorney General or any other 
person to bring class actions.  Nothing in this act 
shall be construed so as to deprive a consumer of 
any statutory or common law right to bring a class 
action in common law or a violation of another 
statute without resort to this act.165 
CONCLUSION 
While it is appropriate to consider the rights of sellers, 
state legislatures should seek to promote only that business which 
respects and upholds the rights of consumers.  In the words of 
James Madison, “If men were angels, no government would be 
necessary.”166  But because sellers cannot always be trusted to 
keep the consumer’s best interest in mind, comprehensive and 
powerful consumer protection statutes are necessary to force 
compliance.  Consumers also play an important role in effective 
and efficient consumer protection, as the only reason sellers 
drafting appropriate contract terms matters is if consumers read 
and enforce the rights within those contracts.  The New Jersey 
legislature was correct in its creation of a broad consumer 
protection statute like the TCCWNA, but just as the technology 
164. CAL CIV. CODE § 1780 (West 2018).
165. CAL CIV. CODE § 1752 (West 2018).
166. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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of consumer transactions has evolved, the alteration of such 
consumer protection statutes is necessary to ensure that the 
legislative intent lives on in the new world full of online and 
electronic consumer transactions. 
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